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ABSTRACT: This article examines the Labour Party’s attitude to the 
finance  of  the  British  rearmament  programme in  the  later  1930s, 
principally with reference to debates in the House of Commons. It is 
suggested that the party’s opposition to the National Government’s 
borrowing  for  rearmament  was  strongly  influenced  by  continuing 
bitterness  over  the  political  crisis  of  1931;  and  that  focussing 
criticism  on  the  economic  aspects  of  the  rearmament  programme 
helped Labour to mask its divisions over the validity of rearmament 
itself. Labour politicians’ varying reactions to John Maynard Keynes’s 
arguments  in  favour  of  defence  borrowing are  explored;  as  is  the 
party’s  attitude  to,  and  impact  upon,  Neville  Chamberlain’s  1937 
proposals  for  a  ‘National  Defence  Contribution’.  Moreover,  it  is 
argued that, as the political situation in Europe deteriorated, Labour’s 
policies were influenced further in the direction of central planning 
and ‘conscription of  wealth’,  as  an alternative to borrowing, which 
was  alleged  to  be  inflationary.  Finally,  it  is  suggested  the  party’s 
attitude to these questions is illustrative of the way in which economic 
ideas in the public sphere are inevitably conditioned by the political 
interests of the politicians who promote them.
1
I
The Britain of the 1930s is generally known as an era of ‘slump’ at 
home and ‘appeasement’ abroad. Indeed, at the time, these issues - 
perceived  economic  decline  and  alleged  willingness  to  truckle  to 
dictators - formed the main bases of the Labour Party’s attacks on the 
National government.  Economic and foreign policy were, moreover, 
intrinsically connected. G.C. Peden has shown the ways in which the 
government’s  policy  on  rearmament  was  conditioned  by  the  fear, 
voiced  by  Neville  Chamberlain  (chancellor  and  after  1937  prime 
minister), that greatly increased arms expenditure might, in economic 
terms, ‘break our backs’.1 The link between the two areas of policy 
was perhaps even stronger in the mind of the Labour party, given that 
it was committed to the proposition that economic rivalries between 
capitalist nations were the cause of war.2 Labour politicians argued, 
furthermore,  that  because  of  the  class  interests  which  the 
Conservative party represented, the government which it dominated 
was  congenitally  incapable  of  a)  pursuing  a  ‘constructive’  foreign 
policy based on collective security via the League of Nations, and b) 
organising  finance  and  production  in  the  developing  ‘near-war’ 
economy  in  an  equitable  and  efficient  fashion.  Labour  aspirations 
towards a socialist foreign policy based on international co-operation 
thus went hand in hand with calls for a domestic economy planned on 
socialist  lines.  These  beliefs  underlay  the  party’s  hostility  to  the 
government’s defence finance schemes in the later 1930s. As Clement 
Attlee,  the  party’s  leader,  put  it  in  1937,  home and foreign  policy 
‘cannot  be  separated.  The  foreign  policy  of  a  Government  is  the 
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reflection of its internal policy.’3 And, as a ‘capitalist’ government, the 
incumbents could be trusted in neither sphere.
Therefore, the government’s borrowing of large sums of money 
to pay for defence was attacked, both as the expensive consequence 
of a failed foreign policy, and as bad finance in its own right. This 
article  examines  the  arguments  Labour politicians  made about  the 
economics of rearmament, partly in order to derive lessons about the 
party’s  economic  world-view,  and  partly  in  order  to  explore  the 
political function of economic arguments. It aims to show how such 
arguments were conditioned in the interest of politics; that is to say, it 
examines the ways in which Labour’s economic policy was affected by 
the interpretation of recent political history, by the day-to-day dictates 
of inter-party warfare, and by unfolding European and world events. 
It  also  sheds new light on the question of  Labour attitudes to the 
ideas of John Maynard Keynes.
These  questions  are  explored  primarily  with  reference  to 
debates in the House of Commons. The official record of these is a 
neglected source for the study of Labour’s economic policy during this 
period. There is such a wealth of extant archival material on Labour’s 
policy  deliberations,  and  so  many  contemporary  pamphlets  and 
treatises, not to mention the party’s annual conference reports, that it 
is  quite  understandable  why historians  have  for  the  most  part  not 
taken  on  the  additional  burden  of  ploughing  through  Hansard.4 
However, this has perhaps skewed the accounts they have presented 
too  much  in  favour  of  Labour’s  ‘young  economists’  (e.g.  Hugh 
Gaitskell, Evan Durbin and James Meade) and away from an arguably 
more significant group of people - the party’s leaders in parliament. 
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After all, the average voter was far more likely to read a newspaper 
account of a speech in the Commons than to read a Fabian Society 
pamphlet. Parliamentary debate, far more than today, was a vital way 
for the party to maintain its public profile.
First, then, the economic and foreign policy background to the 
rearmament  finance debates  of  the  1930s  will  be  examined.  Next, 
Labour’s opposition to the 1937 defence loans bill will be analysed, 
with particular reference to Keynes’s views on this subject. Then, the 
party’s attitude to Neville Chamberlain’s proposed National Defence 
Contribution will be looked at, and its influence in modifying its form 
will be assessed. Following on from this, the party’s approach to the 
government’s proposed extension of its borrowing powers in 1939 will 
be examined, in order to gauge the impact of the deterioration of the 
European political situation on Labour’s economic views. Finally, the 
positive  proposals  offered  by  Labour  will  be  explored,  in  order  to 
assess the extent to which the party offered a credible alternative to 
the government policies it attacked.
II
The  second  Labour  government  had  been  ejected  from  office  in 
August 1931. Ramsay MacDonald, prime minister and Labour leader, 
abandoned  Labour  to  join  with  Liberals  and  Conservatives  in  a 
National  government,  of  which  he  became  head,  subsequently 
inflicting massive defeat upon his former party at a general election in 
October.  Labour  was  reduced  to  46  seats  in  the  Commons  (there 
were, in addition, a half-dozen ILP and other rebels). This course of 
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events  was  brought  about  by  a  financial  crisis,  the  causes  and 
seriousness  of  which  for  a  long  time  after  remained  a  highly 
contentious  topic.  Moreover,  arguments  about  the  crisis  were 
constantly recruited into debates about defence finance in the later 
1930s. Because Labour had, as a consequence of 1931, been painted 
by its opponents as the party of financial irresponsibility, its leaders 
were subsequently keen to demonstrate their rectitude through the 
advocacy of  budgetary orthodoxy.  They were,  moreover,  nervous of 
possible  laxity  amongst  their  followers  on  this  score.  As  former 
minister H.B. Lees-Smith warned privately, two years after the Labour 
government’s collapse, ‘It is dangerous to suggest to our people that 
they need not balance the budget’.5 For if Labour appeared weak on 
this  issue,  then  it  would  not  be  possible  to  criticize  the  National 
Government  when  it  violated  its  own  orthodox  canons.  And  such 
criticism formed a vital part of Labour’s strategy - for, given that the 
government  claimed  the  reestablishment  of  sound  finance  as  its 
raison d’etre,  to challenge it on this score called the government’s 
very  legitimacy  into  question.  As  Sydney  Silverman  MP  argued  in 
1939, if the National Government’s massive borrowings for defence 
were contrasted with the relatively ‘paltry’ debts run up by Labour, 
the  political  controversy  that  had  projected  that  government  into 
power could easily be seen as ‘dishonest and fraudulent’ in nature.6
And  just  as  Labour  challenged  the  government’s  ‘national’ 
pretensions  at  the  domestic  level,  so  the  party  rejected  a  ‘purely 
national’ policy at the world level.7 It was alleged that the government 
was  both  incompetent  and  hypocritical  in  its  handling  of  foreign 
affairs  as  a  result  of  reliance  on  such  a  policy.  But  although  the 
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government’s  real  and  apparent  failings  provided  Labour  with 
political ammunition, the party had its own foreign policy difficulties. 
George Lansbury, the party’s leader in the Commons after 1931, was 
an unconditional pacifist - and a significant body of the party was of 
the same view. Labour’s official position, however, although based on 
the  aspiration  towards  a  world  socialist  commonwealth  and  the 
outlawing  of  war,  did  not  imply  a  renunciation  of  force  under  all 
circumstances,  but  rather  support  for  the  ill-defined  concept  of 
‘collective security’ under the League of Nations. At the same time, on 
the  party’s  left,  Stafford  Cripps’s  small  but  vocal  Socialist  League 
opposed the official policy, on the non-pacifist ground that the League 
of  Nations  was  ‘nothing  but  the  tool  of  the  satiated  imperialist 
powers’.8 
In March 1935, the government announced that in view of the 
deteriorating world  situation,  the nation would equip itself  to  deal 
with foreign threats, and that this would entail additional spending.9 
Developments later in the year, in reaction to Mussolini’s invasion of 
Abyssinia,  went  some  way  towards  clarifying  Labour’s  position  on 
such  questions,  but  also  reinforced  the  party’s  suspicion  of  the 
National  government’s  foreign  policy.  Faced  with  government 
declarations of support for strong action against Italy via the League 
of Nations, Labour had to decide whether or not it would countenance 
a  ‘League  war’.  After  a  powerful  attack  upon Lansbury  by  Ernest 
Bevin,  the  leader  of  the  transport  and general  workers  union,  the 
party conference overwhelmingly  rejected the pacifist  and extreme 
socialist positions by 2,168,000 votes to 102,000. Lansbury resigned, 
and was replaced by Attlee. 
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There  was,  therefore,  an  apparent  temporary  congruence 
between Labour’s policy and that of the government - both sides gave 
public backing to collective security. Labour thus had difficulty, during 
the  subsequent  general  election  campaign,  in  establishing  the 
distinctiveness  of  its  position;  infuriatingly,  the  party’s  political 
clothes  had  been  stolen  by  its  opponents.10 But  the  government’s 
apparent betrayal of Abyssinia and the League, in the aftermath of the 
election,  caused  disgust  in  Labour’s  ranks.  Moreover,  Stanley 
Baldwin, the Prime Minister, had given his word that ‘there will be no 
great armaments.’11 The majority within the Labour party held that 
collective  security  would  render  increased  national  armaments 
unnecessary, so when Baldwin later went back on this promise, his 
government was attacked for promoting a dangerous arms race. As 
Morgan Jones, Labour chairman of the public accounts committee, put 
it  in 1937, ‘this expenditure is proposed by them [the government] 
because they are thinking in terms of inevitable war.’12
However, the main lines of Labour’s attacks on the government 
over  defence  finance  were  decided  even  before  the  1935  general 
election - and before the government first notified parliament of its 
intention to borrow for defence. Moreover, the argument was at first 
couched, not in terms of foreign policy, but in terms of living down the 
legacy of 1931. At an election strategy meeting in October 1935 (the 
election  was  in  November),  the  possibility  was  raised  that  the 
National Government might propose a defence loan. Bevin - hardly a 
militant pacifist - thought this ‘the most dangerous thing that might 
go before the country.’ Hugh Dalton, chairman of the party’s Finance 
and Trade Policy sub-committee, concurred on the following grounds:
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In 1931 we were attacked because we could not balance the 
budget by taxation. We should reverse that and turn it against 
the  Government.  Whatever  is  required should be  met  by the 
taxation  of  those  able  to  pay  ...  We  stand  for  an  honestly 
balanced  budget.  A  defence  loan  would  be  a  great  financial 
ramp.13
III
It  is  thus  no  surprise  that,  when  Chamberlain,  in  his  April  1936 
budget, first suggested that a part of the nation’s emergency defence 
expenditure  might,  in  future  years,  properly  be  met  out  of  loan, 
Labour reacted accordingly. F.W. Pethick-Lawrence MP, who had been 
financial secretary to the Treasury in the second Labour government, 
argued that this would be ‘a very grave new departure from principles 
of finance to which we have been accustomed in this House’, and gave 
notice  that  his  party  would  oppose  such  a  loan  scheme  were  it 
brought forward.14 (Arthur Greenwood, Labour’s deputy leader, also 
argued that expenditure on armaments ‘helps to twist the economic 
life of the nation out of its normal course’ and would cause ‘social 
wreckage’ when all the money had been spent and industries had to 
try  to  reconvert  to  normal  production.)15 Chamberlain  had  first 
considered the  idea  of  borrowing for  defence  in  reaction to  Lloyd 
George’s January 1935 proposal for ‘a great Prosperity Loan’; but he 
had received Treasury advice that such borrowing would be improper, 
as this category expenditure ought to be met out of revenue. Officials 
in due course came round to what was admitted to be the ‘heterodox’ 
idea of a defence loan; but it is notable that Labour criticisms of the 
idea in fact had a great deal in common with Treasury fears that such 
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a  loan  would  breach  good  financial  practice,  and  be  inflationary.16 
Labour  also  opposed  Chamberlain’s  efforts  to  raise  money  for 
rearmament through indirect taxation by increasing the tea duty by 2 
pence per pound, as this would weigh most heavily upon the poor.17
On 11 February 1937, Chamberlain announced in the Commons 
that  the  government  proposed  to  ask  for  general  powers  to  raise 
capital or use realized surpluses for defence expenditure up to a sum 
not exceeding £400 million spread over a period not exceeding five 
years.18  (This  was  part  of  a  broader  £1500  million  rearmament 
programme.) A special Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) meeting was 
called  to  decide  Labour’s  reaction,  which  proved  to  be  one  of 
outrage.19 At a series of  by-election meetings in Manchester,  Attlee 
and Herbert Morrison (a defeated leadership rival),  denounced the 
proposal.  Attlee  dwelt  at  length  on  the  alleged  hypocrisy  of  the 
National Government’s leaders, contrasting their present willingness 
to  borrow  for  defence  with  their  former  attitude  to  the  Labour 
government’s  borrowing  to  pay  for  unemployment  relief.  The 
Manchester Guardian reported his words thus: 
This £400,000,000 meant there would be no attempt in future to 
balance the Budget. This payment of current expenditure out of 
loan  was  contrary  to  all  canons  of  good  finance.  “Do  you 
remember that scream against the Labour party’s unorthodox 
finance in 1931 when they borrowed £100,000,000 for life?...
“Now we are going to have £400,000,000 for death. ...”20
He  also  alleged  that  the  National  government  had  connived  at 
German rearmament ‘because of its hatred of Russia.’21 Morrison too 
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denounced ‘the drifting, indecisive and incompetent foreign policy of 
the Government’, which he linked with its economic failings:
The Government has reverted in spirit to the policy that led up 
to the Great War. Not  only  is  the  taxpayer  being  heavily 
burdened by Britain’s being involved in a competitive arms race, 
but now the assets, the labour and the future resources of the country 
are  to  be  pledged  by  borrowing  for  current  expenditure  on  
armaments.22
An editorial in the  Daily Herald, the Labour movement’s newspaper, 
likewise  denounced  the  proposed  loan  as  ‘foolish’,  ‘immoral’  and 
‘inflationary’. The paper’s city editor, Douglas Jay, went still further: 
‘Mr. Chamberlain is setting out along the paths of Nazi finance.’23
The  stage  was  therefore  set  for  a  harsh  attack  on  the 
government in the House of Commons. A government resolution in 
favour of the defence loan was debated on 17 and 18 February. The 
task of opening for the opposition fell  to Pethick-Lawrence,  who at 
this time was Labour’s principal financial spokesman in the Commons. 
Pethick-Lawrence’s  knowledge  of  finance  was  great,  perhaps  too 
much  so  for  parliamentary  purposes;  as  he  later  recalled, 
Chamberlain could often outwit him in debate by ‘feigning ignorance 
so as to trap me into making impromptu explanations, which he knew 
would be too technical for the House of Commons to understand.’24 On 
this  occasion,  Pethick-Lawrence  opened  by  casting  doubt  on  the 
chancellor’s assertion that the expenditure would be non-recurring, 
as the arms bill was likely to grow, and then moved on to a discussion 
of the merits of  deficit  financing. He claimed that in the relatively 
buoyant  economic  conditions  then  current  -  buoyant,  that  is, 
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compared with the prior depths of the slump - the kind of borrowing 
the  government  proposed  would  unbalance  the  Budget  in  an 
economically  destabilising  fashion.25 Pethick-Lawrence  was  familiar 
with the ideas of Keynes, having helped explain to Francis Williams, 
the  editor  of  the  Daily  Herald,  the  mathematics  of  the  recently 
published  General  Theory.26 Referring  in  part,  presumably,  to  this 
work,  he now remarked that ‘There is  almost unanimous economic 
opinion  ...  that  it  may  be  wise,  whether  it  be  in  accordance  with 
orthodox traditions or not, in a slump to borrow money and pump new 
purchasing  power  into  the  community,  enabling  it  to  keep  itself 
afloat.’ However, ‘it is thoroughly bad to unbalance the Budget at a 
period when boom is shortly coming,  because that accentuates the 
boom and accentuates  the slump that is  to  follow.’  Such a course, 
taken now, would be ‘most dangerous’, and the defence loan would be 
‘rank inflation’.27 Keynes himself later discussed the defence loan with 
Pethick-Lawrence directly.
A further contribution to the debate,  from Hugh Dalton, both 
echoed Pethick-Lawrence’s economic themes, and reflected Labour’s 
continuing  internal  tensions  over  the  issue  of  rearmament  itself. 
Dalton was a ‘hawk’ on this question, having told the 1936 Labour 
conference  that  ‘a  Labour  Government,  if  it  came  into  power 
tomorrow ...  would  be  compelled  to  provide  an increase  in British 
armaments’  -  a  highly  controversial  remark,  albeit  hedged  with 
references  to  potential  future  disarmament  under  the  auspices  of 
collective security.28 Accordingly, he now emphasized that the question 
before  the  House  was  ‘not  a  vote  for  or  against  armaments  in 
general’, nor ‘a vote for or against armaments at any particular level’, 
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but simply a vote for or against a particular method of raising money. 
The loan was objectionable because it would lead to the budget being 
‘gravely unbalanced’ for the next five years, and would be inflationary 
at the present stage of the trade cycle. Chamberlain’s plan for the 
loan to be repaid over a period of thirty years was implausible: ‘who 
believes  in  these  paper  schemes?’  Moreover,  ‘purely  on a  point  of 
economics  and  not  on  the  question  whether  these  armaments  are 
necessary or not’, the rearmament programme was causing resources 
to  be  diverted  away  from houses,  schools,  bridges  and  other  civil 
projects. Because it would thus add nothing to the consumable goods 
available  to the masses of  the people,  the loan would create  more 
inflation  than  were  it  used  for  such  purposes.  It  was  therefore 
thoroughly bad finance,  Dalton argued,  particularly when it was in 
fact possible to put the whole burden of arms expenditure upon the 
direct taxpayer.
He went on to suggest ways in which this could be done. One 
alternative was a steep increase in the scale of death duties - an old 
Daltonian theme. Another was to tackle the ‘arms racket’: a large part 
of the weapons bill could be met ‘by a special tax analogous to the 
excess profits duty of the last war upon persons who have secured 
undeserved  additions  to  their  wealth  through  armaments.’ 
(Chamberlain  would,  in  fact,  shortly  develop a  proposal  on similar 
lines  to  this,  with  intriguing  political  results.)  For  good  measure, 
Dalton rounded off  his speech with an attack on the government’s 
foreign  policy,  arguing  that  the  ‘very  fair  international  prospect’ 
bequeathed by the Labour government in 1931 had been squandered. 
Had  the  National  Government  not  ‘made  an  utter  mess’  of  the 
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disarmament conference (established by the Labour foreign secretary, 
Arthur  Henderson),  the  need  for  rearmament  ‘would  have  been 
outside  the  bounds  of  possibility’.29 Such claims  formed  a  running 
theme in all quarters on the Labour side. 
The debate continued the following day, with Cripps speaking at 
length. He was prepared to acknowledge, he said, the necessity for 
armaments ‘in the circumstances which now beset the world’. Yet the 
issue at stake was not whether or not armaments ought to exist in a 
particular country, rather the use to which those weapons might be 
put, and by whom. Money for arms should properly be found, not out 
of loan, but out of taxation. However, ‘when I am asked to trust this 
Government  with  the  expenditure  of  that  money,  then  I  answer 
without hesitation, “Not at any price.”’ This was because the weapons 
would be used ‘for the continued domination of the subject peoples’ 
and because the government ‘are far more likely to be the allies of 
Fascism than the allies of Russia or any other working-class country’.30 
At this time, Cripps was prominent in the Labour movement as a left-
wing ‘irritant’  to the leadership,  but had little  influence on official 
policy. Attlee, winding up the debate for Labour, nonetheless provided 
a  class-based  analysis  of  the  arms  programme,  with  which  Cripps 
could easily have agreed:
The weakness of all the armaments of the Government is that 
there is no spirit behind them but the spirit of a feeble class 
Imperialism  ...  It  is  a  spirit  which  is  in  tune  with  the 
Government’s home policy and which makes their foreign policy 
hopeless, because you cannot hope to carry out a policy of social 
justice abroad, when you rest upon social injustice at home.31
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The resolution was passed by 329 votes to 145, a normal and healthy 
result for the government, but with the opposition vote also holding 
up well. The Labour speakers had all agreed on the economic defects 
of the loan proposal, which would be inflationary and thus penalise 
the poor. The majority wanted also to criticize rearmament per se - at 
least if, as must have been the case, it was to take place under the 
National government - whereas Dalton wished to avoid commenting 
on  this.  But  equally,  all  speakers  were  able  to  agree  that  the 
government’s past foreign policy was to blame for the sad state of 
world affairs. They could agree with Attlee that ‘We should not have 
allowed ourselves to get into such a position’ as that in which Britain 
now found herself: ‘When we left office the world was moving towards 
peace.’32 Nonetheless,  as  the  European  situation  deteriorated  still 
further,  there  was  a  risk  that  internal  Labour  differences  on 
rearmament would come increasingly to the surface.
IV
The  Labour  Party’s  view  that  the  loan  would  have  bad  economic 
consequences was rejected by Keynes, who took the view that ‘the 
Government’s  rearmament programme certainly seems to postpone 
for some time the prospect of an industrial recession.’ Speaking at the 
annual meeting of National Mutual Life Assurance on 24 February, the 
economist argued that ‘the sums which the Chancellor proposes to 
borrow are well  within our capacity;  particularly if  as  much of the 
expenditure as possible is directed to bringing into employment the 
unused resources of the Special [i.e. depressed] Areas.’ Over a period 
of five years there should be no problem in finding £400 million of 
investible sums; ‘Thus it lies within the power of the Chancellor to get 
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his  money  without  producing  conditions  of  inflation.’33 Keynes’s 
verdict immediately became a subject for political controversy.
The next day saw the Commons debate on the second reading of 
the defence loans bill. Chamberlain, opening for the government, was 
quick to quote Keynes’s view that the loan could only be inflationary 
were it to involve an excess of borrowing over genuine savings.34 Lees-
Smith, who had been returned to the Commons in 1935, pounced:
The Chancellor quotes Mr. J.M. Keynes on one of the very few 
occasions when it suits  him,  but  no one has  spoken about  the 
Chancellor’s habit of borrowing, and also of refusing to borrow, at 
the wrong time with more contempt than Mr. J.M. Keynes.  If  he  is 
now  to  bring  up  Mr.  Keynes  as  a  great  authority  for  the  
Government to quote, I would only say that we on this side of 
the House have our own  authorities  just  as  good  and  more 
authoritative than Mr. Keynes.
He  then  cited  Hubert  Henderson,  the  former  secretary  of  the 
government’s own economic advisory council, as an opponent of the 
loan.  Lees-Smith  went  on  to  claim  that  the  borrowing  would 
precipitate  a  slump,  albeit  only  ‘a  few  years  hence’  when  arms 
expenditure slackened:
If the Chancellor knows his Mr. J.M. Keynes, he will remember 
that in he past  he has always pointed out ...  that the proper 
corrective for this would be to reserve our borrowing now, in 
order that when armaments’ expenditure falls off we could use 
that to increase or to maintain purchasing power, and to stop 
that sudden fall in prices which otherwise might precipitate a 
trade slump.35
This exchange,  then,  is  an intriguing example of  the way in which 
Keynes’s economic opinions were recruited into political debate at the 
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public level.36 Both the Conservative and Labour leaders clearly felt 
that he was a weighty authority worth quoting; but, naturally enough 
perhaps, only when his ideas coincided with theirs. Nonetheless, on 
the Labour side, there was also a certain amount of private dialogue 
with Keynes which, in turn, influenced the economist to express his 
views on rearmament finance yet more fully.
Pethick-Lawrence  was  responsible  for  this.  Having 
corresponded with Keynes intermittently over a period of many years, 
the MP sent him a copy of the views he had expressed in parliament 
on the issue of the loan. Keynes responded, on 3 March:
The Chancellor says that £80,000,000 [per year over five years] 
is not inflationary. You say that it is. He would probably agree 
that  £200,000,000 a year would be inflationary, and you would 
agree that £20,000,000 a year is not. Therefore it is a question 
of figures, and neither of you appear to me to give any detailed 
justification of your views.
He also wrote that he was minded to publish an article in The Times 
in order to ‘assist the discussion’.37 Pethick-Lawrence answered on 5 
March.  The letter  appears  to have been lost  -  no copy survives  in 
either the Keynes or Pethick-Lawrence papers -  but the gist seems 
clear  from  Keynes’s  subsequent  reply.  Pethick-Lawrence  was 
concerned that the defence loan would result in inflation because of 
insufficient manufacturing supply to meet the increased demand the 
new  borrowing  would  result  in.  Keynes  indicated  that  this  was  a 
pertinent  line  of  thought:  ‘Fundamentally  this  is  not  a  matter  of 
finance, but of calling out, as you say, new sources of production.’ The 
answer  would  depend on the  elasticity  of  supply.  Keynes  believed, 
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nonetheless, that the defence programme could be carried through 
without inflation without any ‘punitive measures’ to stop alternative 
civil projects; ‘though doubtless there will be cases where shortage of 
plant  will  force  the  manufacturer  to  choose  between one thing or 
another.’  He enclosed with his letter an advance copy of his  Times 
article.38 
This was published on 11 March. Keynes sought to estimate the 
amount  of  borrowing  that  could  safely  be  undertaken  without 
inflation.  He  concluded  that  the  amount  proposed  by  Chamberlain 
‘need not be inflationary. But unless care is taken it may be rather 
near  the  limit.’  He  suggested,  therefore,  that  it  was  necessary  to 
increase both imports and exports, in the former case to bring forth 
new sources of industrial supply, and in the latter to offset the effect 
of the increased imports on the balance of payments. The export drive 
should  focus  on  the  staple  industries,  for  this  was  where 
unemployment  was  concentrated.  Furthermore,  the  government 
should concentrate as many defence orders as possible in the special 
areas, for ‘it is only by using resources which are now unemployed 
that the job can be got on with, except at the cost of great waste and 
disturbance.’ In other words, Keynes did not simply wish to stoke up 
demand and leave the supply side to take care of itself; he conceded 
the ‘Need for planning’ (emphasis in original) and proposed a central 
government organization that would collect economic information and 
provide policy advice.39 
Pethick-Lawrence felt, however, that Keynes had not gone far 
enough in his supply side proposals: ‘I am not quite sure ... whether 
you allow sufficiently for the specialised character of the demands’. If 
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the  new  defence  demand  was  to  be  concentrated  mainly  in  the 
metallic and building industries, ‘is there not inherently some inflation 
unless people are deliberately checked from other usage of the metals 
(e.g. motor cars) and luxury building?’40 Keynes did not, in fact, reply 
further; it seems clear that he felt the remedies he had proposed were 
sufficient, and did not feel the need to expand on the points he had 
already  made.  The  correspondence,  however,  considered  together 
with the Labour contributions to the Commons debate, is significant. 
Partly, this is because examples of direct discussion of Keynes’s ideas 
by senior Labour figures have a certain rarity value.41 But also, this 
evidence can be used to throw light on Robert Skidelsky’s claim that 
Labour opposition to the defence loan was based on a combination of 
pacifism and orthodox finance.42
Clearly, both doctrines remained influential within the party, but 
this  is  not  enough  to  explain  Labour’s  attitude.  The  party  was 
committed not to pacifism but to collective security. Although critics 
could,  and  did,  argue  that  the  latter  was  merely  a  cloak  for  the 
former,  even  Dalton,  a  supporter  of  rearmament,  opposed  the 
government’s  planned  method  of  paying  for  defence.  (It  seems 
reasonable  to  speculate  that  Bevin  did  too,  given  his  expressed 
attitude in 1935.) This leads to the question of finance. Certainly, the 
commitment  to  ‘an  honestly  balanced  Budget’  remained,  not  least 
because of an almost obsessive desire to prove national Government 
double standards over the events of 1931. Yet, there was a willingness 
to grant, hypothetically, that it might be correct in times of slump to 
unbalance the budget in order to stimulate the economy; Lees-Smith 
described  as  ‘common  sense’  Keynes’s  suggestion  that  the 
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government  should  begin  to  prepare  public  investment  schemes 
against  the time that  they were  needed.43 However,  given that  the 
borrowing that was presently proposed would take place at the peak 
of  the  trade  cycle,  when,  outside  of  unemployment  blackspots, 
shortages  of  materials  and skilled  labour  were  already  starting  to 
appear, the loan could create inflation without curing unemployment. 
The corollary of this, which was implicit in Pethick-Lawrence’s letters 
to  Keynes,  and  which  developed  yet  more  strongly  before  the 
outbreak of war, was that extensive physical economic planning was 
the  only  way  to  resolve  this  impasse.  Arguably,  Labour  was 
unnecessarily  cautious  about  the  safe  extent  of  government 
borrowing.  And arguably,  many of  the  party’s  politicians  advanced 
facile positions on both foreign and economic policy. But, equally, the 
party’s position on the loan was not the wholly unsophisticated result 
of knee-jerk economic orthodoxy. An alternative policy was beginning 
to emerge.
V
The defence loans bill passed through the Commons without difficulty, 
its second reading being approved by 307 to 132. Chamberlain’s next 
defence  finance  innovation,  however,  hit  stormy  waters,  giving 
Labour, in due course, the chance to make a constructive impact on 
the final form of the government’s proposals. Chamberlain’s plan was 
for  a  special  tax  on  increased  profits  called  the  National  Defence 
Contribution (NDC) - in effect, a new form of excess profits duty, as 
previously suggested by Dalton. This was introduced in April 1937 as 
part  of  the budget -  Chamberlain’s  last  before his elevation to the 
premiership.  The  announcement,  made  towards  the  end  of  the 
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chancellor’s  speech,  was  greeted  in  bewildered  silence  on  the 
government benches, but with a few cheers from the opposition side.44 
Leo Amery,  at  this  time a  National  government  backbencher, 
suggested in his diary that the political aim behind the measure was 
‘to forestall any Socialist cry about armament profiteering’.45 He was 
right,  but this  should not be taken to mean that Chamberlain was 
cynical.  He  was  genuinely  worried  about  profiteering,  and  shared 
with his Labour opponents the fear of ‘a feverish and artificial boom 
followed by a disastrous slump’.46 But, as he had hoped, the wind was 
taken out  of  Labour’s  sails  –  or  so  it  seemed.  Attlee  attacked  the 
budget as a whole as being unbalanced, as a result of the defence 
loan, and as being thus, in effect, ‘the first of a new series of war 
Budgets’; but his response to the NDC proposal was merely to wish 
the chancellor luck ‘in the endeavour to put salt on the tails of the 
profiteers.’47 The following morning, the Daily Herald ran an editorial 
which was eulogistic of the plan’s principle: ‘It is socially equitable 
and  it  is  economically  sound  at  a  time  when  a  speculative  boom 
resulting from rising profits is one of the dangers most to be guarded 
against.’ (Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the  Herald  also felt that the plan 
should be implemented in a more drastic form than the government 
proposed.)48 The honeymoon, however, was not to last.
This  was  because the plan ran into difficulties  both with the 
government’s own supporters and with the city, where, the day after 
the budget, £200 million was wiped off the value of shares. Part of the 
problem was that the tax was badly designed. Because it was targeted 
at  increased  profits,  it  would discriminate against  firms which,  for 
example, were young and growing, or which had suffered especially 
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badly in the slump, and were now beginning to recover. As Keynes 
wrote in  The Times on 23 April,  ‘It will  fall  arbitrarily, heavily and 
disproportionately  on  the  ordinary  shareholders  in  a  minority  of 
enterprises  which happen to suffer  from an unlucky conjunction of 
circumstances  ...  The only  apparent  principle  behind its  anomalies 
and arbitrary incidence is that it is a tax on enterprise, growth and 
youth  as  such.’49 As  both  the  flaws  in  the  tax  and  the  market 
disturbance  caused  by  them  became  apparent,  the  potential  for 
Labour to attack Chamberlain over the issue became clearer.
However, as B.E.V. Sabine has noted, the party faced a dilemma. 
It was tempting to attack the government on the ground that the NDC 
had caused an unjustified disturbance to industry and had not been 
properly thought out or explained. But equally, to press for changes 
might mean that an (arguably) proto-socialist measure would end up 
being whittled down.50 The divisions thus caused in Labour opinion 
were evident in a debate in the socialist weekly Forward in early May. 
Tom  Johnston,  MP  for  West  Stirlingshire  and  the  paper’s  former 
editor, wrote an article attacking the NDC on three grounds. First, 
under the tax, ‘the landlord and the rentier are to go free’. Second, 
companies registered abroad would escape. Third, the tax would not 
hit prosperous industries, such as brewing and tobacco, which had 
long made high profits, which were thus unlikely to  increase. In the 
same issue, Ernest Davies, the prospective parliamentary candidate 
for Peterborough, argued similarly that the NDC was  a confidence 
trick:
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The Chancellor’s desire is to create the impression in the mind 
of the country that he  is  taxing  excess  profits  and  curbing 
speculation. His object is to nip in the bud it  is  to  prepare public 
opinion to receive the workers’ claims unsympathetically.51
But  the following week,  William Leach,  a  Labour MP with  pacifist 
tendencies,  defended the NDC strongly.52 It  was no criticism to say 
that the landlord and the rentier had been left out. They should be 
included if  possible  within  the  scope  of  the  tax,  but  the  tax  itself 
should certainly be preserved: ‘Labour should support the tax, oppose 
whole-heartedly the coming attempts to weaken it by concessions and 
make  the  Chancellor  feel  he  can  rely  on  our  votes  to  resist 
intimidation  from  the  City.  The  tax  is  worthwhile  [emphasis  in 
original].’53 Similarly,  in the Commons, Labour opinion was divided. 
Cripps hoped that ‘this tax will be a permanent feature of taxation ... 
by  which  private  industry  will  be  able  to  gradually  replaced  by 
national and state-owned industry’.54 A.V. Alexander MP argued that to 
allow businesses to make profits first, and then to tax some of those 
profits, was the wrong way to deal with profiteering; although he later 
changed his mind and said that the principle which Chamberlain had 
adopted  was  acceptable,  if  not  the precise  form of  the  tax  itself.55 
Morgan Jones steered a middle course, arguing that the principle was 
fair, but that the tax would be unjust in its incidence.56
Fortunately for Labour, Chamberlain’s own problems more than 
eclipsed the party’s own divisions. On 27 April, under pressure from 
his  own  side,  he  was  forced  to  promise  further  consultation  with 
business organizations, including the Federation of British Industry, 
as  to  the  form of  the  NDC;  in  a  weak  Commons  performance,  he 
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admitted that he had only chosen 1933, 1934 and 1935 as the base 
years  by which increased profits  would be measured ‘as  one must 
mention something in describing a scheme of this kind’.57 Labour now 
scented blood. Chuter Ede MP said that it was now clear that it was 
impossible  to  know the  Chancellor’s  plans  until  he  had  met  in  ‘a 
secret conclave’ with business leaders.58 Pethick-Lawrence said that 
the NDC was being made the subject of ‘a kind of Dutch auction. The 
Chancellor puts forward a tax and one or two people in the House and 
the  Country  object,  and  he  alters  it.’59 The  Tribune,  the  recently-
launched left-wing weekly, described the debacle as a victory for the 
‘Profit Defence Gang, in and out of Parliament.’60
At  the  end  of  May,  Chamberlain  replaced  Baldwin  as  prime 
minister;  on  the  day  that  he  kissed  hands  his  party’s  finance 
committee  begged him to withdraw the NDC.61 It  was  left  to  John 
Simon, his successor as chancellor, to introduce a revised version of 
the tax, but this received short shrift from both sides of the House. 
Dalton described it, on 31 May, as ‘an administrative monstrosity, a 
financial fantasy, a device for the endowment of accountants and of 
lawyers’.  He  conceded that  there  was  a  case  for  a  special  tax  on 
profits, but argued for a simpler tax with a larger yield. Douglas Jay, 
in the Herald, had been advocating a straightforward extra 5% tax on 
company profits  as assessed for income tax.  Dalton suggested that 
this idea should be considered.62 Morrison took the line that the NDC 
was ‘a mere political device designed to meet the criticisms of the 
Labour Party against armament profiteering.’63
The mortal blow, however, was delivered from the government 
side.  Tory  discontent  was  rife.64 Winston  Churchill  exploited  this, 
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delivering  a  devastatingly  witty  speech  from  the  backbenches, 
expressing the hope that ‘we shall not have a draggle-tailed, tattered 
tax  forced  through  the  sulky  lobbies’.  Subsequently,  Chamberlain 
stood  up  to  concede  that  the  NDC would  be  withdrawn,  and  that 
Dalton’s  suggestion of  a  simpler  tax with  a  larger  yield  should be 
adopted  in  its  place.65 The  measure  finally  enacted  bore  a  strong 
resemblance to Jay’s profits tax plan.66 This was a significant coup for 
Labour.  In  spite  of  its  own  divisions  on  the  issue,  the  party  had 
benefited from the split on the government side; the superior wisdom 
of  Labour’s  own  economic  experts  had,  on  this  question,  been 
implicitly acknowledged.
VI
At the same time, the party was preparing to take a firmer stance on 
the question of rearmament. In July 1937 the parliamentary Labour 
party  decided  by  45  votes  to  39  to  abstain  on the  annual  service 
estimates, rather than follow the traditional practice of voting against. 
The result  was  largely  due to Dalton’s  skilful  canvassing,  and was 
subsequently  endorsed  by  the  party  conference  in  October.67 
Nevertheless, the minority remained vocal. At that conference, when 
Bevin argued that rearmament had revived international hopes that 
Britain would face down the dictators,  he was strongly rebuked by 
Aneurin  Bevan  MP:  ‘Does  he  really  mean  that  the  Government’s 
rearmament policy has reassured Czechoslovakia in the light of the 
Government’s betrayal of Abyssinia, of China, and of Spain?’68 Even if 
Bevin’s stance was ultimately vindicated, in the short term this was no 
easy  point  to  answer.  Therefore,  Labour’s  attitude  to  rearmament 
finance continued to be influenced in some quarters by doubts about, 
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and sometimes by outright hostility  to,  the purposes for  which the 
money was to be spent.
All the same, there was a growing awareness within the party 
that  war  was  becoming  ever  more  likely,  and  that  the  economic 
repercussions  of  this  were  deserving  of  attention.  In  the  1936-9 
period, discussion within XYZ (Labour’s unofficial group of financial 
experts) focussed on ‘the technique of running an all-out controlled 
war economy.’69 Party politicians and thinkers, moreover, argued that 
the  developing  emergency  justified  existing  Labour  objectives  - 
notably a planned economy and increased social  welfare provision. 
For example, in October 1938 Pethick-Lawrence gave a talk entitled 
‘Can we afford it?’ to the Edinburgh city business club. He argued for 
‘intelligent economic planning’, in order to prevent the rearmament 
process  depressing  working-class  living  standards:  ‘the  decisive 
factor is not finance but economics ... Can our economy be made to 
produce what we require?’ Answering in the affirmative, he concluded 
that the choice between ‘guns or butter’ was a false dichotomy. Social 
services,  and with them working-class purchasing power, should be 
maintained  and  extended,  in  order  that  the  nation’s  productive 
resources  should be fully employed.70 It  was felt  in some quarters, 
moreover,  that if  war did come, it  might provide an opportunity of 
achieving,  at least  partially,  some socialist  aims.  As Hugh Gaitskell 
argued in February 1939, ‘we must not only concentrate on winning 
the  war,  but  also  on  achieving  a  greater  equalisation  of  income, 
national income control, and avoid increasing the National Debt.’71
Labour,  then,  was  to  some  degree  prepared  to  adapt  its 
economic message to changing political circumstances. This became 
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increasingly necessary as the international situation deteriorated; as 
it  became  clear  that  the  government  was  likely  to  seek  further 
borrowing  powers  to  pay  for  rearmament,  it  became  increasingly 
difficult to maintain, given the sums involved, that all the requisite 
money could in fact be found through taxation. Thus, an alternative 
line of criticism suggested itself. As an internal party memorandum 
noted in December 1938, ‘the Chancellor has intimated that further 
loan  powers  may  be  needed.  To  contest  this  on  grounds  of 
misapplication of previous loans would be an admirable opportunity’.72 
Therefore,  when, In February 1939, the government put forward a 
new  defence  loans  bill,  which  would  allow  its  borrowing  to  be 
increased to £800 million, Labour took a new line of attack. The party 
proposed an amendment that recognized ‘the regrettable necessity of 
an unprecedented defence programme’. However, ‘in the interests of 
efficiency and public economy the Bill ought to be preceeded by more 
effective  measures  for  the  co-ordination  of  the  services,  the 
organisation  of  supply,  and  the  elimination  of  excessive  private 
profits.’73 As Alexander put it, ‘the real point of our charge ... is that in 
this national extremity we ought to be getting value for money; and 
we  are  not.’  Expenditure  was  not  being  properly  supervised,  he 
alleged, and, as a result, aircraft and munitions manufacturers were 
making  profits  that  were  unreasonable  in  the  face  of  the  nation’s 
need.74
Labour’s stance was a credible one, given the evidence that had 
lately  emerged  on  this  question.75 Dalton,  moreover,  making  the 
party’s initial reaction to Simon’s announcement, appeared to signal a 
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more realistic approach than before on the question of borrowing for 
defence:
I think we should show a sense of complete unreality if we were 
to  argue  that  all  this  additional  burden  should  properly  be 
placed upon annual taxation ...  there is no reason to suppose 
that  an  enormous  addition  to  the  ordinary  load  of  annual 
taxation  would  have  any  effect  than  that  of  increasing 
unemployment still further.
However, he suggested, a substantial part of the bill could be met ‘by 
the  taxation  or  arms  profiteers’,  by  special  taxation  of  very  large 
incomes, by increasing the rates of death duties at the higher levels, 
and perhaps,  in the future,  by ‘some such plan as a capital  levy.’76 
Other Labour speakers also took up this idea. (For the subsequent 
evolution of this proposal see below.) Yet this, to some degree, served 
to confuse Labour’s position on the loan issue. As government MPs 
did not hesitate to point out, some Labour MPs (such as Dalton and 
Pethick-Lawrence)  seemed to indicate  that  some money would still 
need  to  be  provided by  borrowing,  whereas  others  (such as  Lees-
Smith) suggested that a capital levy would extinguish all need for a 
loan.77 Opinion within the party also divided on the views that Keynes 
now put forward on the economic impact of rearmament.
In a pair of articles published in The Times on 17 and 18 April 
respectively,  the  economist  argued  that  ‘the  problem  of  abnormal 
unemployment will cease to exist during the financial year 1939-40’, 
as a consequence of the increased loan expenditure. Thus, owing to 
both increased tax receipts and the reduced costs of unemployment 
relief,  that  expenditure  would,  in  due  course,  pay  for  itself.  The 
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limiting factor in avoiding inflation, therefore, was not ‘finance’, but 
the  physical  capacity  of  the  country  to  carry  out  the  rearmament 
programme. He saw the shortage of skilled labour as a key part of 
this  problem.78 Some Labour figures  reacted with hostility to these 
arguments.  Richard  Stokes  MP  referred  to  Keynes  as  ‘one  of  our 
leading mumbo-jumbo economists’, and mocked ‘his discovery that as 
a result of this expenditure unemployment will come down, and that 
this  is  going  to  be  dreadful  because  there  will  only  be  750,000 
[unemployed] people left on whom we can draw, and most of them 
probably will be unskilled.’79 G.R. Sandison, prospective parliamentary 
candidate for Southend-on-Sea, described Keynes as ‘the bogey boy of 
capitalist  economists’,  who,  he  said,  ‘argued  that  the  present 
rearmament  programme  of  the  Government  will  abolish 
unemployment altogether, and that therefore we did not need to do 
anything about it.’ Sandison went on to say: ‘It may be that the first 
effect  of  rearmament  will  be  to  decrease  unemployment  in  some 
measure, but we, in the Labour Movement, know that so long as there 
is capitalism so long will there be unemployment.’80
Other Labour spokesmen, however, attempted to use Keynes’s 
arguments to justify socialist policies and to attack the government. 
Lees-Smith claimed that Keynes’s ‘modern scientific argument’ was a 
vindication  of  traditional  socialist  underconsumptionism.81 George 
Ridley  MP  argued  that  if  Keynes  was  correct,  and  government 
borrowing could indeed eradicate unemployment, ‘how much bigger 
is  the  crime of  the  Government  in  refusing to  engage  in  a  public 
works policy over the last seven or eight years’.82 Johnston made a 
similar  point  in  an  article  in  Forward,  arguing,  moreover,  that 
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‘afforestation  and  land  drainage  and  mass  rehousing  would  have 
yielded us some return upon our capital, and war preparations yields 
us no such return [emphasis in original].’ However, ‘what is important 
is  that  one  of  our  greatest  living  economists  has  arrived  at  the 
conclusion  that  we  can,  when  we  desire  to  do  so,  reduce  our 
unemployment figures by a million.’83
Pethick-Lawrence,  for  his  part,  took  the  opportunity  to 
articulate in greater depth the case that he had first put to Keynes 
himself in 1937: ‘Mr. Keynes argued that, so long as unemployment 
remains, there cannot very well be inflation ... I want to suggest that 
that  does  not  necessarily  follow  in  this  case’.  Although there  was 
much in Keynes’s articles with which he agreed, he said,
It is only to a very limited extent that you can adapt round pegs 
to  fit  into  square  holes,  and  there  might  very  well  be  a 
continuance  of  a  considerable  amount  of  unemployment  in 
certain areas and in certain industries, while at the same time 
there might be an acute shortage of skilled labour in certain 
bottle-necks where labour is urgently needed for the purposes 
of rearmament.
Given that  Keynes had specifically  argued for  a  department of  co-
ordination  in  order  to  help  mobilize  the  labour  supply,  Pethick-
Lawrence’s criticism was not, perhaps, wholly fair. Pethick-Lawrence 
continued: ‘Unemployment will  not disappear merely as  a result of 
throwing money about. It will never disappear unless the Government 
use this money with planning in order to bring the whole available 
manpower of the country into operation.’84 Keynes would surely have 
agreed with this conclusion; one may surmise, therefore, that the real 
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difference between the two men lay in the scope and extent of the 
kind of planning they favoured. Pethick-Lawrence’s party, of course, 
favoured a more dirigiste approach, based on physical controls over 
resources.  (This  would  later  be  reflected  in  Labour’s  attitude  to 
Keynes’s  wartime  compulsory  saving  plan.)85 Indeed,  as  war  came 
nearer, Labour’s calls for such planning became not only more urgent, 
but increasingly plausible.
VII
The  notion  of  economic  planning  had  been  central  to  Labour’s 
domestic programme since 1931.  The policy had been adopted not 
least  because  it  represented  the  antithesis  of  the  economic 
gradualism of the MacDonald era.86 The need to prepare against the 
contingency  of  war,  however,  now  created  an  immediate  practical 
justification for the idea. Dalton outlined Labour’s view of planning, 
when speaking on the budget in May 1939. ‘We are living at present 
in a prolonged and sinister twilight between peace and war’, he said; 
yet the budget failed to solve the problem of how to organize a ‘near-
war economy’. The requisite national plan should provide five things. 
First, ‘the necessaries of life for all our people and full provision for 
their  effective  defence  both  against  bombs  and  against  poverty.’ 
Second, ‘that there should be no cake for anyone until all have bread 
and the nation has a sufficiency of arms.’ Third, ‘an opportunity for 
every willing worker.’ Fourth, ‘social justice in the carrying of great 
burdens’. Fifth, ‘a deliberate and efficient scheme to mobilise men, 
money and materials  for  the common good and for the security of 
all.’87 By  thus  linking  social  justice,  full  employment  and  sound 
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defence, Dalton built up a powerful indictment against a government 
which, in Labour eyes, had failed in its duties on all of these points.
But  if  such  declarations  of  general  principles  were  broadly 
convincing,  Labour  was  still  not  wholly  united  when  it  came  to 
discussing practical policy. In the last months before the outbreak of 
war,  problems  centred  mainly  on  the  question  of  ‘conscription  of 
wealth’. Labour had first adopted, and then abandoned, the idea of 
capital levy in the aftermath of WWI. (Dalton and Pethick-Lawrence 
had been among its most prominent advocates.)  As has been seen, 
this idea resurfaced early in 1939, in reaction to the government’s 
proposals for further borrowing; but the idea was soon replaced by 
the rather different idea of ‘an emergency tax on wealth’. This would 
be an annual tax,  as  opposed to a once-for-all  contribution. As Jay 
recounted in his autobiography:
By  April,  it  seemed  probable  that  even  the  Chamberlain 
Government  would  introduce  military  conscription.  Gaitskell 
and I  now feared that  the Parliamentary Labour Party  would 
make  a  fool  of  itself  by  demanding  resistance  to  Hitler  and 
voting against conscription at the same time. So, together with 
[Evan]  Durbin,  we  devised  a  scheme  to  avert  this,  and 
successfully sold it to Dalton.
The  proposal  was  that  the  Labour  party  should  accept  military 
conscription if the government would in turn accept conscription of 
wealth, in the form of a special defence tax on accumulated fortunes. 
This  would  be  levied  each  year,  for  at  least  so  long  as  military 
conscription continued; and was aimed at preventing an increase in 
the size of the national debt. Jay, Gaitskell and Durbin put this idea to 
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Attlee in a paper dated 24 April - two days before Chamberlain did, 
indeed,  announce  the  introduction  of  military  conscription.  Dalton 
arranged for the three young economists  to meet Attlee,  Morrison, 
Alexander, Arthur Greenwood and Emanuel Shinwell at the House of 
Commons.  This  group  was  converted  to  the  idea  and  agreed  to 
recommend it to the PLP: ‘But the latter body ... turned it down by a 
clear majority - on the ground that military conscription could never 
be  accepted  by  the  Labour  Party.’88 Dalton  and  Pethick-Lawrence 
continued nonetheless to advocate the idea of the tax in public; but 
with the party having blocked the suggested  quid pro quo, Labour’s 
claims to favour genuine ‘equality of sacrifice’ could not now carry 
full conviction.89 Similarly, the party’s calls for a Ministry of Supply 
with extensive powers of control over industry were not matched by a 
willingness  to  countenance  relaxation  of  trade  union  restrictive 
practices in order to increase production.90 This was to a great extent 
because  of  fears  of  the  National  Government’s  intentions,  but  it 
blunted the effectiveness of the argument.
VIII
The ‘conscription of wealth’ episode was an  example of how, in the 
last  years  of  peace,  Labour’s  divisions,  ambiguities  and 
inconsistencies  on  defence  policy  had  important  repercussions  for 
economic  policy.  This  phenomenon  was  particularly  evident  in  the 
party’s  generally  hostile  attitude  to  defence  borrowing.  Labour 
politicians  insisted  that  this  was  unsound  finance,  yet  they  also 
advocated borrowing for public works in time of slump. Of course, to 
the  extent  that  they  argued  that  it  was  simply  the  timing  of 
government  borrowing  that  was  wrong,  this  was  perhaps  not 
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unreasonable.  However,  the crucial distinction was perceived to be 
between  borrowing  for  ‘unproductive’  and  for  ‘productive’ 
expenditure. Again, there may have been something in this point. But, 
from  the  political  point  of  view,  attacking  rearmament  borrowing 
because it was uneconomic left open the question of whether or not 
the expenditure itself was moral - a question which, within the party, 
was  highly  controversial.  Therefore,  just  as  Labour’s  doctrine  of 
collective  security  helped  gloss  over  the  differences  between  the 
party’s  quasi-pacifists  and its rearmers, so its approach to defence 
finance  fulfilled  a  similar  function.  It  provided a  formal  consensus 
around  which  the  different  wings  of  the  party  could  coalesce  -  a 
consensus,  which,  however  was  open  to  significantly  different 
interpretations.  Some  politicians  maintained  their  criticisms  of  the 
government  defence  finance  programme  as  far  as  possible  along 
purely economic lines;  others alleged that rearmament itself  would 
bring war closer; yet others argued that a socialist government might 
safely rearm,  but that  a  capitalist  government would use arms for 
exploitative  and  crypto-fascist  purposes,  enriching  the  arms-
merchants who backed it into the bargain.
What these attitudes had in common, however,  was that they 
were based on a ‘fierce political hatred’ of the National Government.91 
Bitterness  over  the  events  of  1931  was  accentuated  by  perceived 
foreign  policy  ‘betrayals’;  government-opposition  relations  were 
abnormally bad, and, in particular, were not improved by the failure of 
Chamberlain to hide his clear contempt for his opponents. This made 
it unlikely that the government would make much progress in winning 
Labour round to its views on defence finance. Perhaps even more than 
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is usual for an opposition party, Labour was predisposed to reject any 
measure that the government might bring before parliament. But, in 
developing its policy on this issue, the party did not react merely in 
response to narrow domestic political concerns. Labour did adapt its 
economic ideas in the face of world events; this was reflected in the 
way in which planning and social  reform policies were adjusted to 
meet the new ‘near-war’ situation. And, as the NDC episode showed, 
the party also succeeded, to some degree, in having a constructive 
impact on the policy of the government itself.
Indeed,  with hindsight,  Labour’s  advocacy of  planning stands 
out as the strongest part of the party’s critique of defence economics. 
In the light of the events of 1940, it  seems difficult to gainsay the 
party’s contemporary view that the rearmament effort was lacking in 
co-ordination and central  direction.  As Walter  Elliot,  Chamberlain’s 
minister of health, admitted to the cabinet in November 1938, a more 
wholehearted economic effort might not have been possible ‘without 
some radical change in the organisation of this country’.92 But that, of 
course, was exactly what the Labour Party wanted. This is not to say 
that Labour’s own planning ideas were necessarily well defined, or 
that  there  were  not  possible  problems  with  its  proposals  for 
conscription  of  wealth  (which  might,  if  enacted,  have  damaged 
confidence, and in fact have thus made the finance of rearmament 
more difficult). But, nevertheless, Labour was fulfilling in an effective 
way one of its key functions as an opposition party - drawing attention 
to shortcomings in the government’s methods.
What light, though, does Labour’s approach to the economics of 
near-war  cast  upon  the  party’s  economic  policy-making  more 
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generally?  The  key  point,  of  course,  is  that  this  was  not  a  purely 
abstract  process.  Politicians  had  to  arrive  at  positions  quickly, 
sometimes perhaps on the basis of inadequate briefing, in reaction 
both to specific government proposals and to broader political events. 
In  so  doing,  they  were  animated  not  only  by  abstract  intellectual 
principles, but also by the desire to ‘dish’ their opponents politically, 
and,  if  they  were  wise,  by  the  wish  to  do  as  little  as  possible  to 
jeopardize an often fragile party unity. There was nothing unworthy 
about  these  concerns;  indeed,  such  situations  are  the  normal  and 
inescapable lot of political parties. This is because economic ideas as 
they develop in the public sphere are inevitably conditioned, to some 
degree, by the political interests of those who promote them. As its 
gradually evolving attitudes to the near-war situation demonstrated, 
the  Labour  Party  in  the  later  1930s  was  no  exception.  Arguably, 
indeed,  these  political  influences  on  economic  policymaking  had 
positive benefits, not only for Labour, but for the country as a whole. 
Inculcating the party with a greater degree of realism and flexibility 
than perhaps it is generally credited, Labour’s increasingly persuasive 
attacks on the policies of the National Government were brought forth 
with conviction at  a time when Britain was desperately in need of 
constructive political and economic alternatives.
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